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different in community property states, in common law states, usually,
the only legal enforcement of the equal economic marital partnership
comes at the marriage's end, either on divorce through equitable
distribution or on death through the existence of the elective share
and, of course, those devices are notoriously manipulable, fallible and,
frankly, open to all kinds of evasion. Our income tax system is
riddled with inequity, deficiency and downright irrationalities. Before
we "reform" it in the name of fair treatment of marriage, we need to
confront what our ideas about marriage really are.
PROF. BECK: Our final panelist is Bruce Bartlett.

THE POLITICS OF THE MARRIAGE PENALTY

Bruce Bartlett
MR. BARTLETT:***** Thank you. They have asked me to
talk about right and wrong ways to fix the marriage penalty, but what
I really want to do is talk about the politics of all of this and pick up
on Professor Christian's question in the last panel.
The recent history of concern about the marriage penalty
really results from June O'Neill's efforts. The Congressional Budget
Office ("CBO") report in 1997 was the trigger, which began a lot of
this discussion. 40 I like to think I had something to do with it. I wrote
the first article in a newspaper that called attention to the CBO
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the author of two books and, a syndicated columnist. Mr. Bartlett is the author of The
Marriage Penalty: Origins, Effects, and Solutions, which appeared in Tax Notes, vol. 80,
no. I I (Sept. 14, 1998). In addition, his other articles have appeared in many papers
including The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times; Mr. Bartlett regularly

appears on national television and radio programs.
40 See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:
MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997).
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study. 4'
Immediately, thereafter, a number of Republican
congressmen and senators picked up on this issue and began to agitate
and attempt to do something about this issue.42 I think it is important
to understand that politically most of this discussion about the
marriage penalty and tax policy is going on in the Republican Party.
This has a lot to do with the various factions within that party and
their particular perspectives.
The marriage penalty appeals to both the liberal and
conservative factions of the Republican Party. On the one hand, the
conservative Christian coalition-types believe discouraging marriage
is a bad idea because they are against people living together in the
absence of marriage. On the other hand, the more liberal types are
concerned about the impact on working women, since working
women tend to be on the liberal side of the Republican coalition.
Initially, it seemed like this was a marriage made in heaven; the two
factions coming together to deal with a specific problem. However,
they quickly realized their interests diverged.
The Christian coalition-types I will use that as a
euphemism for a number of groups whom share that point of view came to the realization that one of the major consequences of getting
rid of the marriage penalty would be to encourage more women to
work.43 As such, you are, on the one hand, encouraging marriage,
which they like, but on the other hand you are encouraging women to
leave the home and no longer stay and take care of the children, which
is an idea they do not like. So the emphasis very quickly moved away
from the simple notion of allowing people to simply choose their
41 See Bruce Bartlett, Marriage Still Takes Its Toll on Taxpayers,
DETROIT

NEWS, July 23, 1997, at A11.
42 See, e.g., H.R. 2593, 105th Cong. (1997); Ryan J. Donmoyer, Over 120

House Members Call for Clinton Support to End 'Marriage Tax", TAX NOTES TODAY,

Jan. 15, 1998, at 10, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file; Sen. Lauch Faircloth
et al., Three Senators' Letter to PresidentOn Marriage Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 21,
1998, at 13, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. See generally Unofficial
Transcript of Ways and Means Hearing on Reducing Tax Burden, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 5, 1998, at 24, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file.
43 Cf Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender
Essentialism in Tax
Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1485 (1997) (stating that

"[w]ives would no longer be discouraged from working in the paid labor force").

19991 ASSESSING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

187

filing status in a way which allows them to come out ahead. First they
came to the realization that there are also bonuses in the Tax Code.
Various people in this area started to lobby, not so much for getting
rid of the marriage penalty, but rather, for expanding the bonuses
because what they really wanted is the traditional single or nuclear
family to be the prime social organization.
This realization has spawned several initiatives on the part of
the Christian coalition. The first of which was to come up with a bill
that called for going back to pure income splitting. That is to say, if
the primary earner is making say $50,000 a year, and the secondary
earner is making $30,000 a year, the couple would be taxed as if each
one was making $40,000. This is similar to the system that existed
from 1948 to 1969. 44 This would have the effect of really doing
nothing about the marriage penalty, but would expand marriage
bonuses. The problem with this proposal is that expanded bonuses go
almost entirely to upper income couples, so it was really not a viable
political alternative. Since then they have advocated increasing the
standard deduction so that it is exactly twice what it is for single
earners. One of the earlier panelist pointed out that this does not
really deal with the marriage penalty either, it is just a type of
generalized tax cut for low-income earners. It may be perfectly
justified on various tax and social grounds, but it has nothing
whatsoever to do with the marriage penalty.
What the Christian coalition has done is take the whole debate
away from a genuine concern about the meaningful problem of
marriage penalties to a generalized way of subsidizing families, where
family is defined as married couples, not necessarily involving
children. Personally, I just do not see any reason why, as a matter of
policy, we should be giving increased tax incentives for people to get
married simply for the sake of getting married. If you are concerned
about family policy, you should be concerned about the status of
children in that relationship; I believe we ought to be orienting our tax
policies in that direction.
More recently another sort of schism has developed, that is a
question of across-the-board tax rate reductions versus targeted tax
Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageand the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv.
339, 380 & n.200 (1994).
44See
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cuts. This has come about as a result of the existence of the federal
budget surpluses - for the first time in two or three decades.45 The
surplus would allow for at least the possibility of doing something,
having some sort of broad-based or large tax cut, such as we had in
1981. 6 In this scenario you have the free marketers against the social
engineers. The social engineers are very much represented by the
conservative faction, social issue people, the Christian coalition-types
who really do want to engineer Government policy to be much more
explicitly pro family in the European sense, where they have family
allowances and the Government routinely sends checks to families for
various purposes. 47 They really like that kind of system without
realizing its implications for control of the family and for growth of
the governmental sector.
You also have the supply-siders who have a Reaganesque
notion that tax policy should be as neutral as possible. They believe
we should move toward a flatter tax system on a broad base; that we

should be getting rid of tax preferences instead of adding them to the
tax code, getting rid of things like the $500 child credit which was put
in at the last Congress at the behest of the pro-family types;48 and
moving toward, ultimately, a flat-rate tax system. This is embodied in
the proposal to cut all tax rates by 10 percent across-the-board which
45See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-By-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM.
L.
REV. 609, 675 (1995) (discussing how a "speed-up" technique was partially responsible
for the last federal budget surplus in 1969); Benjamin M. Friedman, Saving Surplus,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 30, 1998, at A27 (detailing the factors contributing to "the first
budget surplus since 1969").
46 See Richard W. Stevenson, G.O.P. Leaders Try to Stem a Revolt Over Big
Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1999, at AI (discussing pending House vote on the largest
tax cut since 1981); Janet Hook, House G.O.P. Puts Down Revolt on Tax Cut Plan, L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 1999, at Al (commenting on GOP's debate on "what to do with the
federal budget surplus").
47Cf Albert R. Hunt, The Wrong Tax Cuts at the Wrong Time, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 1999, at A19 (noting that Repblican tax bills make an effort to end the marriage
penalty to placate religious conservatives).
48 See Sen. Charles Grassley, New Tax Credit, CONG. PRESS RELEASES, (Fed.
Doc. Clearing House, Inc.), Mar. 22, 1999 (lauding the passage of $500 per child tax
credit); see also Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penaltyin Black and White, 65
U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 798 (1997) (suggesting that a flat-tax system, instead of a
progressive tax system, is one way to remove the marriage bonus/penalty).
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various people are trying to make the main thrust of Republican tax
policy. This is being very much opposed by the more liberal
elements, whose opposition stems from not wanting to do anything for
the rich and not believing the tax cut does anything for the poor. The
result is that they have adopted this idea of just going back to the
marriage penalty. They have gotten behind this idea of increasing the
personal exemption or the standard deduction. The liberal elements
have been joined, once again, by the pro-family types who have
rejoined their brethren in an unholy alliance to have more of a social
engineering type tax code.
So you sort of have the free marketers and supply-siders out
there by themselves now fighting with the fiscal conservatives who
want to pay off the national debt and not cut taxes. This is really
where the debate has come to. It is absolutely unclear how it is going
to be resolved. In part this is because nobody really knows what the
President's views are about these matters. He is not going to voice any
opinion on this; other than to say we cannot have tax cuts until we
save Social Security. 49 However, we also do not know what his plan
is for that. This is the current state of the debate. Personally, I would
like us to think in terms of getting rid of the marriage penalty by
moving towards, as Diana Furchtgott-Roth talked about, a flat-rate tax
system. I think it was implicit in the last panel's discussion that we
should keep progressivity, but deal with the marriage penalty by
changing the filing status. We can do that, but I would rather move
towards a flat-rate tax system that treats everybody the same
regardless of whether they are married or single.
I would just like to finish by pointing out how little all this
discussion and analysis really has to do with tax policy, because so
often the decisions are made on the basis of flimsy kinds of analyses.
A specific example is the $500 child credit, which I spent a good deal
of time working on last year, because I was writing an article for the
National Tax Journal, trying to figure out exactly whose idea it was.50
49See Greg Hitt, GOP Tax-Cut Plans May Face Clinton Resistance, WALL
ST. J., July 12, 1999, at A2; Laurie McGinley & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Clinton DrugBenefit Plan Recasts Medicare Debate, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1999, at A28.
50 See Bruce Bartlett, Tax Aspects of the 1997 Budget Deal, 51 NAT'L TAX J.

127 (1998); see also Tony Snow, Keep it Simple, Bob; Cut Taxes, USA TODAY, May 6,
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The Heritage Foundation, which is very influential in the Republican
Party, had been pushing for many years to increase the personal
exemption to keep it in line with inflation. 5 1 What they discovered is
that it was very hard to explain to people what the benefits of this
were, because it was a function of your tax bracket; that is, how much
tax savings you would get is a function of your rate and that was
really complicated to explain to people. So they just said, we are
going to change it to credit because it is a lot easier to do the math.
They put out tables showing how much of a tax saving you would get
in each congressional district in every state. This was very simple to
do because they just multiplied $500 times the number of children in
the state to pretty much get an idea of what the tax savings would be.
They made this fundamental change in tax policy, going away
from increasing the personal exemption and going toward a tax credit,
just because it was easier for somebody to calculate the tax savings
purely for publicity purposes. Unfortunately, that is the way these
kinds of things are done. The next step is to then have a focus group
or a pollster running around asking questions. And one day Newt
Gingrich decided this is going to be the policy and that was the way it
was done. 52 They never held any hearings, they never did studies, the
Joint Committee on Taxation never had anything to say about it, the
House Ways and Means Committee never had anything to say about
it; the next thing we know it is part of the law and this is the reality of
how tax policy is made in Washington, D.C. Thank you.
PROF. BECK: Thanks very much. I would like to invite the
1996, at 13A.
51 See, e.g., Heritage Foundation, Mission Statement (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.heritage.org/mission.html> (stating that "[t]hc Heritage Foundation is a
research and educational institute - a think tank - whose mission is to formulate and
promote conservative public policies .... "); Heritage Foundation, Taxes (visited Oct. 26,
(listing current and archived
1999) <http://www.heritage.org/library/taxes.html>
documents published by the Heritage Foundation); Jack Torry, Ridge Invokes Kemp in
Scolding GOPfor Inaction on Cities, PrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 7, 1999, at A8
(stating that the Heritage Foundation has influenced the Republican Party's tax policies);
Eric Schlosser, Tales from the Inquisition, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 19, 1998, at 42
(remarking that the Heritage Foundation among other conservative institutions "wield
enormous influence within the Republican Party.").
52 See Douglas Jehl, Republicans Say Clinton's Tax Cuts Aren't Deep
Enough, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994, at All.
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panelists to comment and perhaps start with a pretty simple idea. I
think it is difficult for many people to understand why we do not
simply allow married people to file as single persons. The reason is
largely a matter of history. We would have something like the
German system if we allowed married people to file either at single
rates and also to have the choice of income splitting, in other words, a
choice of bonus only without penalty.
Germany has that system because in the Nazi period
mandatory joint returns stacked married women's earnings on top of
their husband's earnings and automatically taxed them at a higher rate.
That disincentive furthered an explicit policy that women should stay
at home and make warriors for the Reich. However, in the 1950s the
German Supreme Court overturned this marriage penalty as a
constitutional question and forced the introduction of income splitting
as the remedy. 53 Unfortunately, we have had different results in our
courts.
One reason for the difference is that Germany has a
constitutional provision to the effect that the state must protect
marriage and the family, and we have no such provision.54 Instead,
our taxpayers have lost under equal protection and are taxed.5 5
Moving to something like the German system would solve the
problem, provided that Poe v. Seaborn is repealed. I suspect it is
more difficult, politically, to get rid of the bonus that people are
enjoying than it is the penalty.
MR. BARTLETT: The main barrier to moving towards
53 See HENRY J. GUMPEL, TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY

429 (2d ed. Harvard Law School World Tax Series 1969) (citing the decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court of Jan. 17, 1957, BGBI 1957 I p. 186, stating that
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court found unconstitutional the tax policy that treated
husband and wife as a single unit).
54 See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 6(1) (F.R.G.)
(stating
"[m]arriage and family are under the special protection of the state.").
55 See, e.g., Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F,2d 46 (2d Cir.
1982) (holding
that "...

'marriage penalty' deprives [parties] of no constitutional right."); Pierce v.

Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 580 (stating that "[t]he marriage penalty, inequitable as
it is, has been upheld as constitutional."); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Cl. Ct.
1978) (upholding the constitutionality of the "marriage penalty"); Johnson v. United
States, 422 F.Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976). See generally Antoinette M. Pilzner, Tax
Liability Differences Between Married and Unmarried Couples: Do the Married Filing
Statutes Violate Equal Protection?, 40 WAYNE L.REv. 1337 (1994).
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choosing your filing status, at the moment, is the revenue. It would
cost about $30 billion a year in lost revenue.5 6 Given the budgetary
situation, that is the problem. I also believe once they start to think
about it some more they will realize that there are a lot of practical
problems associated with choosing your filing status, such as how do
you allocate income from jointly owned assets? How do you-allocate
deductions from jointly owned things such as houses? How do you
allocate the mortgage interest deduction? Another consideration is
that you would really have to do your taxes three times, each spouse
would have to do their taxes individually and then they would have to
do them together to figure out which way they come out ahead. I
think that in the short run it is really a revenue consideration.
PROF. BROWN: I would point out that in addition to the
revenue issue - based on the Census Bureau data - if you had a
system where you had no penalties, but you had marriage bonuses, not
having penalties would obviously help the African-American
households who are disproportionately paying the penalties, but only
having bonuses would, in effect, disproportionately help the White
couples that disproportionally have the marriage bonuses.5 7 From a
race-based perspective I would have a problem with a system that kept
bonuses but, of course, it would be better than what we have now,
which is a system that has penalties that are disproportionately born
by African-American households.
PROF. CHRISTIAN: I, too, oppose marriage bonuses. That
is, I take exception to proposals that eliminate marriage penalties but
that retain marriage bonuses. As we have discussed, marriage
bonuses tend to fall disproportionately on disparate-income couples,
couples in which one spouse works and the other does not or in which
one spouse works and the other works only part-time. That such
couples receive a marriage bonus means our government is
subsidizing the idea of a stay-at-home spouse, a spouse who
minimizes her connection with the paid work force. A couple
receives a marriage bonus, a subsidy, if one spouse, probably the wife,
stays out of the work force.
56 See Bruce Bartlett, Yes, Eliminate the Marriage Tax Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1998, at A27.
57 See Brown, supra note
1.
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Now, you might view this as an acceptable or even a desirable
policy if you think the government should encourage one parent to
stay at home with his or her children. You would simply pay one
parent, through the marriage bonus, not to work. The problem is that
the marriage bonus is not targeted to this problem. That bonus is not
limited to couples who have children. If a subsidy for the stay-athome parent is desirable, it ought to be made available only to couples
who have children. It ought to be paid only to parents. Paying such a
subsidy through the marriage bonus system, however, makes the
subsidy available to all kinds of disparate-income couples, even those
who have no children. The current system of marriage bonuses does
not limit its benefits to parents, the couples for whom society might
have a reason to desire one spouse to limit his or her work-force
participation.
PROF. LaPIANA: And, of course, finally, there are other
transfer tax problems. There is no barrier to the transfer of capital
between spouses, and those transfers can be structured in ways that
minimize or eliminate the "donee's" control of the property. It
becomes extraordinarily easy to start shifting investment income
around with no problems at all and that somehow looks far from
the kind of reform we are trying to accomplish.
PROF. BECK: I would like to point out that while there would
be serious problems, as Mr. Bartlett points out, in allocating
deductions, expenses and so forth between the spouses to file as single
persons, we have recently faced this problem with reforms on joint
and several liability. In that instance we came up with solutions that
seem halfway reasonable. I believe that even if we move to what I
think is a more rational system whereby everyone files separate
returns, we will still have those problems. We are always going to
have to decide how mortgage interest and other deductions should be
allocated, as long as we keep a system with deductions in place.
Therefore, I am not sure that this is a stumbling block to the halfway
position of giving married couples a choice.
MR. BARTLETT: You might just say it is a matter of
complexity. I believe it is something that people have not thought
about. I think we can deal with these. It is not a barrier.
PROF. BROWN: I agree with Bruce. There is only one article

194

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

[Vol. XVI

that I have read that actually tackled the issue. I think people say,
okay, we can go to individual filing and we can work it out but I think
the devil is in the details, so I am just not convinced that it is as simple
and straightforward as people might suggest. Particularly, given what
we just heard about married couples being able to shift assets.
PROF. BECK: Well, as we heard earlier, many countries in
the world are moving away from, or already have moved away from,
family taxation to individual taxation and so these problems have,
presumably, been faced elsewhere. Canada, for example, has never
had joint filing; it's always had
single filing, so these problems are
58
soluble in principle and in fact.
PROF. BROWN: I believe taking a historical perspective is
often helpful when you ask how did we get here? Well, it started with
the joint tax return and there is a question as to, why did we have the
joint tax return, and scholars might debate why we have the joint tax
return. Professor Caroline Jones has done some excellent work in the
area that points out that one of the reasons why Congress stepped in
and enacted the joint tax return was to help those states that refused to
59
change to community property in response to the Poe v. Seaborn
decision.' So what you have is, I believe, a deeply embedded gender
bias in the Internal Revenue Code.
It appears that the IRC's goal is, on some level, to disempower
women. When you are talking about what type of family is promoted
in the federal tax law, it is the sole wage-earner family. Historically,
that has been the man who works in the paid labor market and the
woman who works at home. We give benefits to that couple. We
don't tax the imputed income, which is the value of the household
services she provides to her family. Congress must have thought it
was a really good thing. A really bad thing is those dual equalearning households. That's bad, we don't want that and we tax them
to death. So we did not get here by accident. We got here, I believe,
by conscious bias that says we want men to work outside the home
58 See, e.g.,

Samuel R. Baker, Planning for United States Corporate

Executives Moving In and Out of Canada, in DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA 55, 65-66 (E.

Newberger ed., 1975) (stating that in Canada "joint husband and wife returns are not
provided for").
282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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and we want the women to work inside the home.
I don't believe those biases are gone, so we are in a political
process with people who have those biases. I do not know how we
get from here to there because I think those households that are
receiving a marriage bonus will fight to the death to keep their
marriage bonuses. As someone in the earlier panel said, they think of
this as an entitlement. This is right, this is the right answer, I should
get more money because I am married; who said that? Well, we have
had ajoint return since 1948,60 that's who said that. So, you know, I
think the biases that are embedded in the Code are embedded in the
legislators that are in Congress that make the laws that basically
penalize, coequal I call them, coequal wage-earning households.
MR. BARTLETT: There- is another important bias that was
brought up, and that is the bias against single people. Being a single
person I am acutely aware of this, I pay more taxes than a married
couple with the same income. In fact, the reason the marriage penalty
came about in 1969 was because the disparity was as much as 40
percent. 6 1 Congress decided to cut tax rates for single people so that
the disparity was not more than 20 percent.62 So you are still being
disadvantaged by 20 percent but you are less disadvantaged than you
were under the previous law. All of the proposals for doing
something about the marriage penalty would almost invariably go
back in the other direction of increasing the disparity between single
persons and married couples and I think that is something to consider.
PROF. LaPIANA: As a single person, I certainly agree. I am
in a situation where if we could marry, my partner and I would receive
a large marriage bonus. But if I put my legal historian hat on for a
minute, I think we have to understand, too, the degree to which this
problem really is caused by an interesting coming together of factors.
As was mentioned earlier this morning, many of the problems we are
discussing under the rubric "marriage penalty" did not occur until the
need to finance the Second World War made many more people

60 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 Stat. 110) 91.
61 See Beck, supra note 9, at 371.

62 See id.
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subject to the income tax.6 3 In addition, for one brief, wonderful
moment in the post-war period, as this country became wildly
prosperous, people who could never before believe that they would
have a middle class life found themselves doing exactly that. Many
factors contribute to the creation of this remarkable time, not the least
of which, of course, was the government's subsidization of higher
education for millions of (mainly white) veterans, many of whom
were from social groups who would never have had that opportunity
absent the War and the G.I. Bill. It is probably fair to say that before
the Second World War many married women may have, indeed must
have, worked for wages outside the home. Their wage earning did. not
raise the questions we consider today. Perhaps they worked "off the
books," or perhaps they and their families were too poor to worry
about the income tax. After the Second World War, however, the
United States economy is such that a family can sustain a middle class
level of existence on the wages of only one spouse. That moment,
however, seems to have been very fleeting and is gone, maybe
forever. It is not surprising, then, that today we are concerned with
the effect of income taxation on married couples. In other words, the
image of the "traditional" one earner (the husband) married couple
may be an accident of the unprecedented growth of the middle class
after the War, made possible by unprecedented prosperity. The belief
that the marriage penalty is something new and perverse may simply
be the product of historical accident - the existence of a brief time
when married women did not work outside the home or rather, when
it was possible to believe they did not.
PROF. BECK: One of the depressing problems about tax
reform is, what I like to call "The Immortality of Bad Law." We
cannot seem to kill a law that is clearly and obviously wrong, instead
we create exceptions. We have lurched from one set of complications
and complication exceptions to the next. We saw a very interesting
example in this last year's reform of the innocent spouse rules.
Instead of just removing joint and several liability from the Code and
removing the Poe v. Seaborn64 liability, Congress enacted a much
63 See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and The Family. A Fresh Look at
Behavioral Gender Biases in The Code, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 983, 990 (1993).
64 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
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more complex set of rules then we had before. This had the
interesting effect of making official the discrimination against married
people. It is much easier to get relief from joint liability if a wife is
separated or divorced than if a she is still married.
However, Poe v. Seaborn remains a big problem. This was
the immortal case with which income-splitting began in this country.
It began as a tax dodge for high-earning husbands in the western
states, who took the position that community property laws required
their non-earning wives to file returns showing half of their husbands'
income in order to beat the progressive system. When the Supreme
Court blessed this tax dodge, in one of its worse decisions ever, it
created a rate disparity between common law states and community
property states. 65 The community property states refused to give up
their advantage so, eventually, the same advantage had to be given to
everyone, hence the 1948 income-splitting on joint returns. 66 But the
marriage penalty itself also comes from Poe v. Seaborn because in
1969 the changes that Mr. Bartlett mentions, when single people were
given a better rate, could not be extended to married people as long as
Poe v. Seaborn was in effect. That is because people on the West
Coast -

married single-earner couples -

could otherwise have split

their income filing separately under Poe v. Seaborn and used the new
favorable single rate, as well, but single-earner couples in the
common-law states could not, because they cannot split their income
on separate returns. This would have created an East-West rate
disparity, which the 1948 compromise was designed to avoid. That is
the sole reason why a new unfavorable rate had to be imposed for
married people filing separately. Well, it would have been easy for
Congress simply to overrule Poe v. Seaborn, and a much better
solution than creating a marriage penalty. However, the Seaborn case
lives on and, I fear, will live on forever.
THE AUDIENCE: This is a question for Professor Christian.
Regarding your point that couples with dramatically different incomes
are the ones more likely to file jointly thereby subjecting the lower or
non-earning spouse to joint and several liability, precisely when it
65 See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.

REv. 1389, 1408 (1993).
66 See Beck, supra note 9, at 369-70.
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makes no sense; it seems that some of those non-delinquent spouses,

probably the women, would win under the innocent spouse provision?
I am wondering if that, in itself, is a problem because it encourages

women to stay financially illiterate thereby creating the very power
dynamics and the worries about intra-family power disparities that the
last panel talked about?
PROF. CHRISTIAN: Great question. It is very difficult for
the non-delinquent spouse, often the wife, to escape the problem of
joint and several liability through the innocent spouse rules. For
example, to prove she is an innocent spouse, a married woman must
show under [I.R.C.] § 6015(b)(I)(C) that she had no actual or
constructive knowledge of the understatement of tax.6 7 Unfortunately,
courts have often construed this provision and its predecessor as
requiring that the wife must prove she is uneducated and woefully
ignorant of the family's financial affairs. 68 Cases exist in which
courts have held that the requirement was not satisfied because the
spouse seeking relief had an advanced degree, was reasonably
intelligent, and therefore, presumably should have known that the tax
67 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1) (1999) provides relief from liability for a joint filer

when:
(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable
to erroneous items of one individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in
signing the return he or she did not know, and had no reason to
know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is
inequitable to hold the other individual liable for the deficiency
in tax for such taxable year attributable to such understatement;
and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may
prescribe) the benefits of this subsection not later than the date
which is 2 years after the date the Secretary has begun collection
activities with respect to the individual making the election.
68 See, e.g., Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989); Friedman
v. Commissioner, 53 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding wife had no actual or
constructive knowledge considering in part her status as a "housewife and unemployed
former secretary with a high school education .... 7"); Shea v. Commissioner, 780 F.2d
561, 567 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that "a [wife's] minimal involvement" in her "family's
financial affairs can satisfy the 'reason to know' standard.").

1999] ASSESSING PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

199

69

return contained an understatement of liability.
In this manner, the innocent spouse rules set up an unfortunate
dichotomy for spouses who seek their application. The rules tend to
reward those wives who keep themselves illiterate either financially or
in other ways, and they tend to penalize those women who seek to
educate themselves even when the education does not extend to tax
issues. So yes, the innocent spouse rules do encourage women to stay
financially illiterate and this, of course, exacerbates other problems
like power disparities within the family.
Incidentally, this problem in the innocent spouse rules arises
only for spouses who are still together at the time the IRS seeks
payment of the deficiency. 70 Thus, the new innocent spouse rules
retain a "fault system" for people who remain married. For example,
if you are married and your husband created the tax deficiency, the
Internal Revenue Service can come after you, the wife, for the tax
deficiency. The wife can get out of that deficiency under the innocent
spouse rules, but only if she shows certain things tending to indicate
her lack of "fault."' 7 1 She must show, for example, that she did not
benefit from the fact that her husband understated the tax liability.
She must show that she did not know about the facts underlying the
misstatement on the return. As I have already stated, she must show
that she had no knowledge of the tax deficiency and that she had no
69

See, e.g., Cohen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1987); Hayman

v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1261-62 (2d Cir. 1993); Cockrell v. Commissioner,
1997 WL 346134 (2d Cir.).
70 I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1) (1999) provides a new limit on individual liability of
spouses who are no longer together, using the following language:
(I) In general. Except as provided in this subsection, if an
individual who has made ajoint return for any taxable year elects
the application in this subsection, the individual's liability for
any deficiency which is assessed with respect to the return shall
not exceed the portion of such deficiency properly allocable to
the individual under subsection (d).
Id. § 6015(c)(1). Compare I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1) (1999) with I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1998).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6015(b)(I)(C) (1999). See also Sanders v.
United
States, 509 F.2d 162, 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1975) (spouse must show lack of actual or
constructive knowledge of deficiency in tax statement and no personal benefit from that
deficiency); Resser v. Commissioner, 74 F.3d 1528, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding
spouse's education did not bar her from "innocent spouse" protection because she proved
the complexity of her husband's financial affairs).
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reason to know of the tax deficiency. This system which applies to
spouses who are still together, is a fault-type system.
On the other hand, for spouses who have separated or
divorced, the new innocent spouse rules under I.R.C. § 6015 now take
a new, non-fault approach. 72 "No-longer-married" spouses now have
the option, if they meet certain requirements, of avoiding the fault
system and electing to use a more beneficial, proportional liability
system. That option is not available at all to people who remain
married.73 So, ironically, an incentive has arisen within the innocent
spouse rules for spouses to divorce or separate to enable the nonguilty spouse to avoid both the draconian rule of joint and several
liability and the difficult hurdles of the fault-based innocent spouse
system. By divorcing or separating, the non-guilty spouse makes
herself eligible for the beneficial proportional liability system. This,
in and of itself, is a marriage penalty, one that is embedded in the new
innocent spouse rules. A non-delinquent spouse is penalized by
staying married and, in this manner, the new innocent spouse rules
encourage divorce.
THE AUDIENCE: This is a question for Professor Brown.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in almost a quarter of all
married couples the female is or the wife is the higher earner and this
is a growing percentage, it has grown from 15 percent 15 years ago.74
Your data would seem to imply that a disproportionate share of these
higher earning women are probably in Black families. Does your data
show that and what implications does that have for some of the
discussion in the earlier panel about power sharing within the
relationship?
PROF. BROWN: My data shows that with respect to AfricanAmerican households at high-income levels, I have more men then
women who are sole wage-earner providers; the percentage is around
twenty something, I am now talking families earning $120,000 and
over, and 5 percent or 9 percent, actually, are women.7 5 So you have
72 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

73 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74See Ann E. Winkler, Earnings of Husbands and Wives in Dual-Earner
Families, 121 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1998, at 42.

75 See Brown, supra note I, at 292-99.
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some Black women who are sole wage earners, but you have more
Black men that are sole wage earners at the upper income level. What
I found interesting is that at the lower income levels it was more likely
that the sole wage earner would be a Black woman than a man,
although at the higher percentile it is more likely to be a Black man
than a woman. This proportion is higher among African-Americans;
there are more Black women who are high income earners then there
are White
women who are sole wage-earners at the high income level,
6
yes.

7

PROF. BECK: We have time forjust one more question.
THE AUDIENCE: This is regarding your discussion of
spousal joint and several liability. The major asset that most families
in the United States own is their home and that is held jointly by
comparative title by the husband and wife. How would you handle,
from a collection point of view, the fact that their major asset is tied
up jointly? If the wife would not be liable for tax consequences, how
would the Government be able to collect those taxes?
PROF. CHRISTIAN: Let us say the husband is the one who
generated the tax deficiency. This is not always the case, but for
purposes of this example, we will say that the husband is responsible
for the tax deficiency. In this situation, the Internal Revenue Service
should be attempting collection from the husband and not the wife. If
the home is owned solely by the husband, then the IRS's levy on the
home is not a problem. The tax burden is falling on the proper party,
the spouse whose income created the burden. However, joint
ownership of property, obviously, raises a big problem, because if the
Internal Revenue Service satisfies the husband's liability by taking a
jointly owned asset, in essence, the wife will bear part of that tax
burden.
THE AUDIENCE: But they would not be able to get it, they
would not be able to execute on it. The husband would have the right
of survivorship therefore, unless the wife was dead the Internal
Revenue Service would not levy on that home unless the judgment
was against the wife and the husband.
PROF. CHRISTIAN: If a couple filed separately, and its
76 See id.
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primary asset is the jointly owned home, what does the Internal
Revenue Service do in that case? Are you saying that for New York
taxpayers, the IRS cannot attach the home?
THE AUDIENCE: I would say in New York State, the IRS
could not execute on jointly held property. I don't know the law in
Michigan but in New York State I would say that the home would not
be reachable.
PROF. LaPIANA: If I can just jump in here? The problem is
there are at least three different views of the rights of creditors to
jointly held property, and sometimes the rules are different for
tenancies by the entireties (which can only exist between husband
and wife)."
There simply is no one nationwide answer to the
question of creditors' rights in jointly held property. The interplay
of federal tax law and state property law varies from state to state.
I believe, however, that you are right about New York - entireties
property cannot be levied on by the creditor of one spouse.
PROF. BECK: Thank you very much.

See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977).

